Abstract-We present a fuzzy extractor whose security can be reduced to the hardness of Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) and can efficiently correct a constant fraction of errors in a biometric source with a "noise-avoiding trapdoor." Using this computational fuzzy extractor, we present a stateless construction of a cryptographically-secure Physical Unclonable Function. Our construct requires no non-volatile (permanent) storage, secure or otherwise, and its computational security can be reduced to the hardness of an LPN variant under the random oracle model. The construction is "stateless," because there is no information stored between subsequent queries, which mitigates attacks against the PUF via tampering. Moreover, our stateless construction corresponds to a PUF whose outputs are free of noise because of internal error-correcting capability, which enables a host of applications beyond authentication. We describe the construction, provide a proof of computational security, analysis of the security parameter for system parameter choices, and present experimental evidence that the construction is practical and reliable under a wide environmental range.
INTRODUCTION

Background and Motivation
S
ILICON Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are a promising innovative primitive that are used for authentication and secret key storage without the requirement of secure memory or expensive tamper-resistant hardware [26] , [53] . This is possible, because instead of storing secrets in digital memory, PUFs derive secrets from the physical characteristics of the integrated circuit (IC). Silicon PUFs rely on the fact that even though the mask and manufacturing process is the same among different ICs, each IC is actually slightly different due to normal manufacturing variability. PUFs leverage this variability to derive "secret" information that is unique to the chip (a silicon "biometric"). Due to the manufacturing variability, one cannot manufacture two chips with identical secrets, even with full knowledge of the chip's design. PUF architectures that exploit different types of manufacturing variability have been proposed. In addition to gate delay, there are PUFs that use the power-on state of SRAM, threshold voltages, and many other physical characteristics to derive the secret.
The (informal) requirements for a PUF are:
1) Upon being given a challenge, the PUF produces a response, and no other data about the internal functionality of the PUF is revealed.
2) Large enough challenge-response space such that an adversary cannot enumerate all challenge-response pairs within reasonable time. 3) An adversary given a polynomial number of challenge-response pairs cannot predict the response to a new, randomly chosen challenge. 4) Not feasible to manufacture two PUFs with the same responses to all challenges. These requirements correspond to what has been sometimes called a strong PUF in the literature.
The silicon PUF approach is advantageous over standard secure digital storage for several reasons:
Since the "secret" is derived from physical characteristics of the IC, the chip must be powered on for the secret to reside in digital memory. Any physical attack attempting to extract digital information from the chip therefore must do so while the chip is powered on. Authentication of devices and secure communication to devices do not require embedding and permanently storing secrets in the devices. Devices therefore do not require non-volatile memory, which is more expensive and not available in all manufacturing processes. For example, EEPROMs require additional mask layers, and battery-backed RAMs require an external always-on power source. PUFs can therefore serve as one way to address the growing counterfeit electronics problem [29] .
For authentication, PUFs usually adopt a simple challenge-response protocol. An entity, call it the verifier, collects challenge-response pairs in a secure location when in possession of the PUF. At any later point of time, to authenticate a remote device, the verifier sends a challenge to the device and asks for the response. 1 If the response "matches" the stored response, verification is successful, else it is not. The simplicity and power of the above protocol motivated the construction of many candidate silicon PUFs. We note that the physical system and the protocol are both stateless (i.e., store no data between subsequent queries and do not require non-volatile digital storage). The stateless property implies that there is no separate "provisioning" stage: the interface exposed by the PUF is static, and any valid query can be made at any time. Unfortunately, none of the candidate constructions have a proof of computational security, and further, most, if not all, of them have been shown to be susceptible to machine learning attacks (cf. Section 3). In the context of stateless PUFs, Gassend et al. [26] write: "An important direction of research is to find a circuit that is provably hard to break ...". In this paper we accomplish this objective.
Physically Obfuscated Keys
Physically Obfuscated Keys (e.g., [44] ) predate silicon PUFs and have sometimes been called weak PUFs in the literature. The (informal) requirements for a POK are less stringent than the requirements for a PUF: (1) a small number of challenge-response pairs, and (2) these responses are unpredictable and depend strongly on the innate manufacturing variability of the device.
Both PUFs and POKs rely on analog physical properties of the fabricated circuit to derive secret information. Naturally, these analog properties have noise and variability associated with them. As environmental parameters vary, so does the "digital fingerprint" measured by the PUF/ POK. If the parameters vary too much, the PUF or POK response will change. In the PUF authentication protocol, "matching" means the response stored by the verifier and the regenerated response are within a chosen threshold.
If a POK's responses are exposed, it can be easily cloned by enumerating all challenge-response pairs and storing them in a table. However, a PUF can be built using public tamper-proof storage, error correction logic, cryptographic primitives, and a POK as we describe below. Choose a POK output or bits derived from the POK output during a provisioning step as the secret key, and error correct the POK outputs when they are regenerated so the key is always the same. Assuming the public helper data associated with the error correcting code does not give away (too much) information about the POK outputs and therefore the secret key, one can use the secret key as one input to a one-way hash function to build a PUF. This PUF is noise-free through error correction using helper data that can be stored on the verifier side. However, even when the helper data is stored offdevice, there is still a requirement for storage on the PUF device for information-theoretically secure constructions.
The reason is subtle: generation of helper data can only be done once or a limited number of times, because the helper data leaks information about the POK outputs as mentioned above. To repeatedly generate helper data an arbitrary number of times under potentially different environmental conditions where POK outputs change significantly requires strong independence assumptions on POK outputs. If these assumptions cannot be made, this provisioning functionality needs to be turned off; else the system can be broken. This implies an irreversible fuse, i.e., storage that is tamper proof. Else, an attacker with physical access just has to modify one bit of storage to potentially break the system by rerunning the provisioning step, as opposed to having to read volatile values in a stateless PUF.
Overview of Our Approach
In this paper, we show how to build a stateless PUF with a computational security reduction. Our construction has internal error correction, and therefore the PUF outputs will be completely stable, assuming the error correction range matches the requirement posed by environmental variation. Our PUF therefore is a controlled PUF [25] , which is much more powerful than a conventional PUF that can only be used for authentication (cf. Section 7.3.3).
We accomplish our task in two steps. First, by making an assumption about the characteristics of the POK, namely, that it can provide "confidence" information, we demonstrate a computational fuzzy extractor that can correct OðmÞ errors in polynomial time. The confidence information is never stored or exposed, and can thus be viewed as a noiseavoiding trapdoor.
Abstractly, confidence information can be thought of as information measured from the POK in addition to the output bits that represents which bits of the output have higher/lower probability of error. This information is available from a large number of POK sources, since many sources define their output bits in terms of whether an analog/ digital value is greater/less than some threshold. In this case, the confidence information would be the distance of the analog/digital value from that threshold. One example corresponds to simply making repeated measurements of a POK (e.g., SRAM state [33] ) and taking a majority vote to produce a bit. The degree of majority would be the confidence information. The most natural example that we know of is the ring oscillator POK (cf. Section 2.1) used in our case study (cf. Section 9), which produces bits based on the sign of the difference of oscillator frequencies.
We stress that while previous constructions leveraging confidence information published their confidence information [13] , [15] , [46] , [47] (which requires persistent memory storage and also affects the information-theoretic security argument) the confidence information in our construction is not persistent; rather, it is regenerated on each key recovery and then discarded. Our PUF remains stateless.
Second, we show given a POK, how to set up a restricted version of a Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem such that a sateless secure PUF is enabled. There are two modes of operation for this PUF. The first is to generate a challenge-response pair, and the second is to return a response given a challenge. Using our error correction scheme, all challenge-response pairs are reliable in that a challenge contains necessary helper data for regeneration to always reproduce the same response. We prove that the stateless PUF protocol is secure under the random oracle model given the hardness of LPN and the strong assumption that the confidence information is independent of the actual bit values. We then relax this assumption by augmenting the construction to selectively inject random noise during challenge-response generation and show that this construction requires a variant of LPN hardness assumption under the random oracle model.
Our Contributions
We defer a detailed comparison to prior work to Section 3, and elaborate on our contributions below.
1) We propose a fuzzy extractor that is able to correct
QðmÞ errors in an m-bit POK output and recover an n-bit key in polynomial time. Two novel ideas enable this result. First, we take advantage of the confidence information as a trapdoor to a hard problem. The confidence information is never stored; it is regenerated (and may change on each key extraction) and then erased (cf. Section 4). Second, compared with traditional LPN/LWE cryptosystems, we use the number of equations m in a novel way-to provide redundancy-and show that setting m ¼ Qðn 2 Þ results in a negligible failure probability for key recovery even with QðmÞ errors (cf. Section 5). 2) LPN is hard given independent, identically distributed (i.i.d.) noise (which corresponds to POK bits in our construction). To provide more flexibility with respect to POK distributions, we give a reduction for a large class of noise distributions that are significantly more relaxed (cf. Section 6). 3) We provide stateless PUF constructions and show that breaking the PUF requires breaking LPN or a variant of LPN under the random oracle model (cf. Sections 7 and 8). 4) We provide experimental evidence that our fuzzy extractor and our PUF construction are efficient and work under significant environmental variation (cf. Section 9).
Organization
We give background for ring oscillator POKs and LPN in Section 2. We discuss related work in Section 3. Section 4 describes how noisy POK outputs can be corrected securely using a computational fuzzy extractor. We analyze the reliability of key regeneration in Section 5, where we show that the confidence information serves as a trapdoor. Section 6 gives a security analysis of our fuzzy extractor, relaxes the assumptions on the POK bits, and also provides quantitative analysis on parameters. Section 7 gives formal definitions and our construction of a stateless PUF, with the corresponding security proofs given in Section 8. We show in Section 9 that our constructions can be efficiently built using ring oscillator POKs. We conclude the paper in Section 10.
BACKGROUND
Ring Oscillator POK
Following the formalization provided in [4] , we first define a Physically Obfuscated Key (POK) as a physical function wherein there is only one challenge. A POK returns a single m-bit response, denoted as e ¼ fe 1 ; e 2 ; . . . ; e m g in this paper.
If the POK response is completely stable across measurements, then constructing a stable secret key or strong PUF would be trivial: just use the POK output as the secret key.
Unfortunately, the POK response in practice will be slightly different each time due to internal noise, i.e.,
e ¼ e const þ e noise ;
where e const is the same for each call to the POK, and e noise is sampled at random from some distribution over f0; 1g m . Error-correcting the POK response to tolerate the noise is a major challenge.
Our case study will be based on the Ring Oscillator (RO) POK, which generates bits by comparing the frequencies of two ring oscillators that are identical by design, yet whose frequencies vary due to manufacturing variation. Each POK output bit is simply determined by which oscillator is faster. It was first observed in [57] that if the difference in counts between the two ring oscillators is large, then one can have higher confidence that environmental changes are unlikely to cause the output bit to flip erroneously when measured at a later time. This difference will be our confidence information (cf. Fig. 1 ). While there have been improvements in ring oscillator structures (e.g., [23] ), our case study uses the basic structure of Fig. 1 .
Learning Parity with Noise
The Learning Parity with Noise problem is a famous open problem that is widely conjectured to be hard [52] , as the best known algorithm is slightly subexponential (2 Vðn=log nÞ ) [5] , [8] , [10] , [30] , [41] . As a result, this problem has since been used as the foundation of several cryptographic primitives [2] , [3] , [9] , [34] .
The problem is posed as follows. Let s 2 f0; 1g n be chosen uniformly at random. Let A 2 f0; 1g mÂn be uniformly random, m ! n. Let e 2 f0; 1g m be chosen from a distribution x. Finally, define b 2 f0; 1g m (where Á is a dot product) as: Note that in addition to the output bits e i , confidence values c i may be made available to the surrounding logic. These confidence values are in the form of the actual differential count between the two ring oscillators, while the POK output bits e i correspond to whether the differential count is greater/less than 0.
The problem is to learn s given only the values of b and A. When each e i is distributed according to probability distribution x.
Conjecture 2.1 (LPN Hardness [34] ). There is no algorithm that solves an LPN problem instance ðA; b; xÞ, where s and A are uniformly random, in time polyðn; 1=ð 1 2 À tÞÞ with non-negligible probability in n, where x is an Bernoulli distribution with bias t.
The LPN problem can be thought of as a special case of the Learning With Errors (LWE) problems discussed by Regev [52] , by allowing the equations to instead be modulo a prime number q (as opposed to 2). However, Regev's reduction to the shortest independent vector problem (SIVP) does not apply to the LPN case. Therefore, the difficulty of solving LPN is a separate conjecture from the difficulty of solving LWE. This paper will focus on a fuzzy extractor and a stateless PUF based on LPN, but our constructions can be extended to the LWE case.
RELATED WORK
PUF/POK Proposals
Although many of the architectures that integrate POKs and PUFs into existing IC technology are new, it should be noted that the concepts of unclonability and uniqueness have been used extensively in the past for other applications [37] . For example, "Unique Objects" are well defined as objects with a unique set of properties (a "fingerprint") based on the unique disorder of the object [53] . One example of early reported usage of unique objects for security was proposed for the identification of nuclear weapons during the cold war [28] . One would spray a thin coating of randomly distributed light-reflecting particles onto the surface of the nuclear weapon. Since these particles are randomly distributed, the resulting interference pattern after being illuminated from various angles is unique and difficult to reproduce. Unique objects were termed Physical One-Way Functions and popularized in 2001 [50] . However, to our knowledge, none of these proposals has an associated computational security argument that shows hardness of model-building or machine learning attacks.
Unlike the proposals described above, silicon PUFs, introduced in [26] , do not require an external measurement apparatus. In the past several years, there have been several proposals for candidate silicon PUF architectures. These include the family of proposals corresponding to the Arbiter PUF [27] , feedforward Arbiter [43] and XOR Arbiter PUF [57] . Machine learning attacks such as those of [54] and [6] have successfully attacked these constructions to create software clones. While other constructions using nonlinear circuit elements (e.g., [42] , [40] , [49]) have not yet been broken to our knowledge, these constructions do not as yet have clear computational security reductions.
Error Correction for Silicon POKs
Silicon POK key generation was first introduced using Hamming codes in [24] and more details were presented in [56] . The security argument is information-theoretic. Specifically, if one requires a k-bit secret from n bits generated by the POK, then at most n À k bits could be exposed. The number of correctable errors is quite limited in this approach.
Fuzzy Extractors for Silicon POKs
Fuzzy extractors [21] convert noisy biometric data (either human or silicon) into reproducible uniform random strings, which can then serve as secret keys in cryptographic applications. Fuzzy extractors typically have two phases: a secure sketch (error correction) phase and a privacy amplification (hashing) phase. The secure sketch phase focuses on the recovery of noisy data w. It first outputs a sketch h (also called "helper data") for w. Then, given h and a future measurement w 0 close to w, it recovers w. The sketch is secure if it does not reveal much about w: w retains much of its entropy even if h is known. This means that h can be stored in public without compromising the privacy of w. However, in typical POK applications, w does not have full entropy, so we need the privacy amplification phase to compress w prior to obtaining a cryptographic key. In the fuzzy extractor framework, it is possible to extract near-full-entropy keys from a POK source while maintaining information-theoretic security.
The information-theoretic security, however, comes at a high cost in terms of the raw entropy required and the maximum tolerable error rate. The secure sketch phase is well known to lose significant entropy from the helper data h, especially as measurement noise increases. Even in cases where entropy remains after error correction (e.g., [48] ), there is not enough entropy remaining to accumulate the 128-bits of entropy in an information-theoretic manner during the privacy amplification phase. According to [38] , the entropy loss associated with the use of the informationtheoretic entropy accumulator alone is ! 128 bits due to the leftover hash lemma.
Works on fuzzy extractors for silicon POKs can be classified based on the additional assumptions they require:
Perfectly i.i.d. Entropy Source. There are several works that created helper data that is information-theoretically secure. [59] uses POK error correction helper data called IndexBased Syndrome (IBS), as an alternative to Dodis' codeoffset helper data. IBS is information-theoretically secure, under the assumption that POK output bits are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). Given this i.i.d. assumption, IBS can expose more helper data bits than a standard code-offset fuzzy extractor construction. Efficiency improvements to IBS that maintained information-theoretic security are described in [31] and [32] .
A soft-decision POK error correction decoder based on code-offset was described in [46] , [47] where the confidence information part of the helper data was proven to be information-theoretically secure under an i.i.d., assumption (the security of the remaining redundancy part associated with the code-offset was not as rigorously addressed in either paper).
We note that while these works created practical implementations based on a provably secure information-theoretic foundation, they did not explicitly address the full key generation process (secure sketch + privacy amplification); they addressed only the error correction (secure sketch) phase. Further, they need the strong assumption on POK output bits being i.i.d., which allows them to publicly reveal the confidence information. Indeed, silicon biometrics are not necessarily i.i.d., and attacks have therefore been performed, e.g., [7] . Our approach achieves the same advantage of using confidence information, but it does not reveal this information. Therefore, our proposal remains secure for non-i.i.d. entropy sources (cf. Definition 6.1).
Computational security based on machine learning heuristics. There were several works [51] [60] [61] that created helper data that is heuristically secure based on results of state-ofthe-art machine learning attacks on PUFs [55] . These designs used a candidate strong PUF based on XORs [57] but leak only a limited number of PUF response bits as helper data to generate a key. After several years of attacks by several groups around the world [18] , [35] , [54] , [55] , [58] , the basic XOR PUF was "broken" in 2015 [6] . There has not been a strong PUF architecture with a reduction from a formal strong PUF security definition (e.g., "strong unpredictability" in [4] ) to a computational hardness assumption accepted by the cryptography community. These works are also limited in scope in that they do not explicitly address the full key generation processing, but address only the error correction phase.
Secure sketch + privacy amplification. To the best of our knowledge, there is one paper that attempted to implement and address the security associated with both stages of a POK fuzzy extractor [48] . The paper accounted for the information-theoretic loss of the error correction helper data, using code-offset syndrome [21] , but did not have sufficient entropy left over from the secure sketch phase to implement an information-theoretically secure privacy amplification stage and instead opted for a more efficient implementation using a lightweight hash called SPONGENT [11] as an entropy accumulator.
Under the assumption that confidence values are independent of the measurement values, information-theoretically secure extractors can also produce a stateless construction as we do in Section 7. However, in our construction, we show how this assumption can be relaxed through a computational hardness assumption of a variant LPN problem.
Computational Fuzzy Extractors
Fuller et al. [22] give a computational fuzzy extractor based on LWE. In Fuller et al.'s scheme, the output entropy improves; the error correction capacity, however, does not. Indeed, Fuller et al. show in their model that secure sketches are subject to the same error correction bounds as informationtheoretic extractors. Their construction therefore requires exponential time to correct QðmÞ errors, where m is the number of bits output by the POK.
Fuller et al., expect that the exponential complexity in correcting a linear number of errors is unlikely to be overcome, since there is no place to securely put a trapdoor in a fuzzy extractor. We recognize that certain kinds of silicon biometric sources have dynamically regenerated confidence information that does not require persistent storage memory and can in fact serve as a trapdoor (cf. Sections 4 and 5). We show that security can be maintained even if the bits generated by the biometric source are correlated (cf. Definition 6.1).
Helper Data Manipulation
The issue of helper data manipulation has been addressed with robust fuzzy extractors [14] , [20] . Their use of a helper data hash do not address recent helper data manipulation attacks in [19] , [36] , including ones that take advantage of the linear, bitwise-XOR nature of code-offset helper data as applied to linear error correction codewords.
In the stateless PUF of Section 7, the helper data comprises (part of) the challenge. Since in an LPN-based fuzzy extractor the key is uncorrelated computationally to the helper information, our scheme can authenticate the helper information in a computationally secure manner via a keyed-hash message authentication code such as HMAC [39] . This results in schemes that are secure in a computational sense against active adversaries that modify the helper data in our fuzzy extractor or stateless PUF construction.
FUZZY EXTRACTOR USING LPN
This section considers how to reliably reconstruct a key s from a noisy POK (or a noisy biometric source). We start with the fuzzy extractor scheme described in [22] , which leverages LWE to extract a pseudorandom string from fuzzy data. We will begin by translating that work from LWE to LPN discussed in Section 2.2.
Construction 4.1. Let k be a security parameter, and let n ¼ polyðkÞ, and m ! n. Define ðA; bÞ Genð1 k Þ, and s RepðA; bÞ as follows: This construction is exactly analogous to Construction 4.1 of Fuller et al. [22] , translated to LPN from LWE (all equations are mod 2 instead of mod q). Therefore, we state the following theorem without proof, as it is analogous to Theorem 4.7 of [22] except under the LPN hardness conjecture. is true, then there is a setting of n ¼ polyðkÞ for which there exists ¼ negðkÞ such that the following is true: For any randomized circuit size s ¼ polyðkÞ and t ¼ Oðlog nÞ bit errors, Construction 4.1 is a ðf0; 1g m ; x; n À oðnÞ; tÞ fuzzy extractor that is ð; sÞ-hard, with failure rate d ¼ e ÀVðkÞ (cf. Definition 2.5 of [22] ).
In the above construction, Decode keeps picking random sets of n equations b i ¼ A i s þ e i and solves for s (see Recovery in Algorithm 1 for details). If t ¼ Oðlog nÞ, Decode succeeds with overwhelming probability after a polynomial number of trials. We will now describe a new extractor algorithm based on LPN that can correct QðmÞ errors in polynomial time. Before presenting the extractor formally, we present an intuitive description. 1: procedure Fab(1 k ; d; h) // Represents the fabrication step. It takes the security parameter k, the desired probability of recovery failure d, a h term that characterizes correlation in the POK bits (defined in Definition 6.1) 2:
Select the size of the secret vector n for the desired security level k based on h (details in Section 8). 3: Compute m such that with probability greater than 1 À 1 , at least m 0 ¼ QðnÞ of the m POK bits are "stable" over relevant noise/environmental parameters. Define "stable" to be Prðe 0 i 6 ¼ e i Þ 2 . The choice of m 0 ; 1 ; 2 along with other details will be presented in Section 5. 4: Manufacture POKs that each produce m bits internally. 5: end procedure 6: 7: procedureðA; bÞ Gen (n) //Gen takes the size of the secret vector n (calculated in Fab) 8: Measure the m POK bits as e ¼ fe 1 ; e 2 ; . . . e m g. 9: Generate a uniformly random secret vector s 2 f0; 1g n . 10: Recovery (e 0 ; T) // Represents the augmented key recovery algorithm. In addition to the noisy POK measurement e 0 , this function also takes T , the set of stable bits in e 0 . 21: Randomly select n out of the m 0 stable bits. 22: Use Gaussian elimination to solve for s on the n selected bits.
23: Check if
i on the remaining m À n equations. An error rate of % 50% implies that the derived s is incorrect. A significantly lower error rate (e.g., 25%) indicates s is correct. 24: If s is incorrect, go back to step 21); else output s. 25: end procedure
Intuitive Description
Recall the description of the LPN problem in Section 2.2, which is also depicted in Fig. 2 . The above construction uses the POK output as the e i values. Therefore, an adversary learns the equations with probability of error being Prðe i ¼ 1Þ ¼ t, where t relates to the entropy of the POK. Having access to the POK allows one to regenerate e 0 i , where Prðe
The regeneration is imperfect due to intrinsic noise of the POK as well as environmental changes. The LPN problem remains hard even for small t 0 implying that key recovery will run in exponential time for QðmÞ number of errors.
A critical enabling property of LPN/LWE is that if one can identify any set of n bits that are correct (e
then one can use Gaussian elimination to solve for s. Therefore, our key intuition is that access to confidence information during the regeneration of the POK bits helps the extractor decide which bits are more likely to be stable (the set of stable bits may be different from measurement to measurement). Then, Gaussian elimination is performed on the set of equations corresponding to these stable bits.
Of course, one must architect the system such that there are enough stable POK bits during each measurement. To this end, the LPN/LWE problem allows arbitrary redundancy in the number of equations supplied. Therefore, we can supply enough equations such that with high probability (see Section 5) the recovery succeeds.
Initially, this may sound similar to using the "mask" data in some POK implementations. However, this approach is fundamentally different and has superior security properties, as we recognize the biometric source itself to be a hidden trapdoor to a hard problem. The confidence information is discarded after use and never exposed. The security proof for this new construction will therefore be identical to that of Construction 4.1, since the adversary receives identical information.
Detailed Construction
In the following description, we will refer to the POK bits as e ¼ fe 1 ; e 2 ; . . . e m g, (e i 2 f0; 1g) and their noisy counterparts (measured during response verification) as e 0 ¼ fe We describe the algorithms associated with the key extraction below. Typically, a fuzzy extractor, informationtheoretic or computational, has the functions Gen and Rep, where Gen produces the public helper information, and Rep takes the noisy biometric bits and public helper information and returns the error-corrected key. This paper expands this construction to include four functions in the extraction process as shown in Algorithm 1.
Before looking into the effects of errors on Algorithm 1, there are several notes to be made.
First, the Fab algorithm can be viewed as system design steps that choose parameters for the desired security and reliability. Project and Recovery together correspond to Rep in a fuzzy extractor, and Recovery is exactly the same as Decode t in Construction 4.1. Second, if the LPN problem is hard, then an adversary in possession of ðA; bÞ cannot compute s as shown in Theorem 4.2. Furthermore, due to the simultaneous hardcore bits of s in the LPN problem, s has n À oðnÞ pseudorandom bits [1] .
Third, the matrix A can be made a public global system parameter as opposed to per-device output to reduce helper data size; this leaves b as the only per-device helper data. This will be the same global A in the stateless PUF construction of Section 7, though there exists a much more fundamental security reason to make A global there.
Lastly, the confidence information c 0 i acts as a trapdoor for identifying "stable" bits in key recovery. Therefore, the key recovery algorithm is faced with a much easier problem and can finish in polynomial time. This will be the focus of the next section.
NOISE-AVOIDING TRAPDOORS
In Section 4, Project leverages confidence information that a bit is regenerated correctly. This section will explore the asymptotic noise tolerance and efficiency of our system, and the required properties of the POKs (biometric source) to provide confidence information.
c i are random variables representing the confidence information of the ith POK bit at the time of initial challenge-response generation. Next, c 0 i are random variables representing the confidence information of the ith POK bit at some point in time later. We note again that confidence data are extracted upon measurement of a POK bit, and are never persistently stored.
Define the corresponding POK bit to be a random variable e i ¼ Signðc i Þ, and e To provide concrete analysis, we consider the probability distribution of the c i and c 0 i random variables, and assume they follow the same zero-mean Gaussian with variance s INTER , shown in Fig. 3 . Note that this directly implies that Prðe i ¼ 1Þ ¼ t ¼ 1=2 for the LPN problem. In actual physical systems, there will be a bias towards 1 or 0, but we will see that assuming a 0.5 bias represents a "worst-case" from the standpoint of error correction. (Note that we will use a different worst-case bias for other purposes, e.g., to determine n given the security parameter in Section 8.)
Now, given that c i and c 0 i represent the random variables for measuring the same bit, the conditional distribution Prðc i jc 0 i ¼ cÞ is much narrower (where c is the actual measured value of c 0 i at regeneration). This distribution is modeled to be a Gaussian distribution with mean c and variance s INTRA , also shown in Fig. 3 .
Also note that c i and c 0 i represent the same POK bit measured at different times, so they have the same distribution (with no prior knowledge). Therefore, 8c, Prðc i jc
In other words, one can use the confidence information collected during the fabrication step to reason about the probability of error at regeneration, or vice-versa.
We may now define the probability of error given confidence information. Since e i ¼ Signðc i Þ, we recognize that the error probability given a measurement of the confidence information is the integral of the shaded region in Fig. 3 , in particular, the CDF up to 0:
Fabrication/Provisioning
Fab must compute m such that with probability greater than 1 À 1 , at least m 0 of the m bits will be stable. Recall a random bit e i is defined to be stable if Prðe 0 i 6 ¼ e i Þ < 2 over relevant environmental parameters.
To do this, we recognize that requiring Prðe 0 i 6 ¼ e i jc 0 i ¼ cÞ < 2 sets a threshold c T on jcj in Equation (1) . If for a particular bit jcj > c T , then the bit is stable. Plug these requirements into Equation (1) and solve for c T (define Erf À1 as the inverse of Erf):
Therefore, the probability that a given bit is stable (has jcj > c T ) can be computed by integrating the PDF of Prðc 0 i Þ, or equivalently Prðc i Þ:
The inequality is because the probability of a bit being stable is smallest when the bit bias is 0.5 (the Gaussian is centered at 0). One can see that as the center of the Gaussian shifts, more probability density falls in the region of jc i j > c T . Therefore, we know that the probability of a stable bit can only be higher than our calculation here expects. Plugging in c T from Equation (2) gives:
The final step is to compute m such that at least m 0 POK bits will be stable with probability 1 À 1 . This is a binomial distribution and is subject to a Chernoff bound. Define X as the random variable for the number of stable bits observed. Fig. 3 . Distribution of confidence information for different POK bits when measured repeatedly over time/environmental parameters. The magenta curve corresponds to the distribution of confidence information across different devices. The blue curve corresponds to the distribution of measured confidence information from the same device in different conditions. We show the probability of error given a confidence measurement c as the integral of the shaded region.
Rearranging,
Since P ST is a function of 2 , given m 0 , 1 , and 2 , one can compute m such that at least m 0 of the POK bits are stable with probability 1 À 1 , as is required.
Projection
We need "truly stable" bits to perform Gaussian elimination, but the bits in T defined above only guarantee Prðe Pr t 0 > alog n ð Þ< e ÀQðlog 2 nÞ : So t 0 ¼ oðlog nÞ with overwhelming probability.
In Recovery, we randomly select n out of the m 0 bits to perform Gaussian elimination. If the n selected bits are all "truly stable," Gaussian elimination on them will yield the correct s and Recovery succeeds. The above probability is given by
Therefore, after polyðnÞ number of iterations, Recovery finds the correct s with overwhelming probability. The overall failure probability-accounting for all types of failures (have less than m 0 stable bits, t 0 ¼ vðlog nÞ, or fail to select n truly stable bits in all iterations)-is at most 1 þ ð1 À 1 ÞneglðnÞ. We can set 1 ¼ Qð2
Àn Þ to get overall negligible failure probability.
We remark again that without the confidence trapdoor, the LPN hardness states exactly that it is infeasible to compute s in polynomial time with non-negligible success probability. Therefore, while an adversary requires exponential time to calculate s, the owner of the fuzzy extractor requires only polynomial time. This is the definition of a trapdoor.
Setting m
We have set 1 ¼ Qð2
Àn Þ, 2 ¼ Qð1=nÞ and m 0 ¼ QðnÞ. To compute m from Equations (3) and (4), we need to characterize s INTRA =s INTER , which decides P ST .
Define s r ¼ s INTRA =s INTER . We first consider a worst-case: s r ¼ 1. In this case, Equation (3) reduces to P ST ¼ 2 2 . Plug them into Equation (4), and one obtains:
In reality, the ratio s r < 1, so the hidden constant in Qðn 2 Þ is small, as will be seen in Section 9.
Improving on the Trapdoor
The above asymptotic result will be improved if we assume s r ¼ oð1Þ. For example, let us pick s r such that P ST is asymptotically constant. 2 To (1) (cf. Fig. 3 ) results in the associated marginal distribution (the error probability):
A constant s r as in the previous subsection clearly implies QðmÞ errors. For s r ¼ oð1Þ, Prðe 
LPN FUZZY EXTRACTOR SECURITY ANALYSIS AND ASSUMPTIONS
The proof of security for an LPN fuzzy extractor using confidence information is identical to Theorem 4.2. This is because the additional confidence information (which may or may not be correlated with the actual value of the POK bit) described in Section 5 that is used to help extract the key is never revealed.
Assumptions on POK Outputs
The POK outputs are used as the noise term in the LPN problem, and our fuzzy extractor construction is secure if the POK outputs are i.i.d. We now provide a significantly relaxed definition of POK source entropy under which the fuzzy extractor construction remains secure. In particular, the following definition describes the class of sources that are secure with LPN and hence our fuzzy extractor.
Definition 6.1. Define a set of L different m-bit entropy sources whose probability distribution may be constructed in the following way:
1) Begin with a set X of m Â L bits that are i.i.d. with This distribution is clearly much more general than an i.i.d. distribution, as it allows for certain bits from the same/different entropy sources to be correlated. For example, consider the ith bit of LPN problem A, and the jth bit of LPN problem B-this distribution can support a nonzero correlation coefficient between these bits, namely, Corrðe A;i ; e B;j Þ. However, it is tighter than min-entropy, as min-entropy allows for individual bits to be "stuck" at one or zero. In this distribution, bits cannot be perfectly correlated (e.g., Corrðe A;i ; e B;j Þ ¼ 1). We will see that h in effect sets the "maximum correlation", and h (as well as 1 À h) must not be 0 or negligible in the security parameter.
Note also that knowledge of which bits are correlated is public (it is assumed that the adversary knows the transformations that are applied). Furthermore, note that the set of bits X is the set of bits across different sources. For this discussion, each source has m bits. If there are L different sources, then X is the set of all L Â m bits. As a result, correlations between bits on different sources is allowable in the definition. Under this assumption, Lemma 6.2 proves the security of the system.
Lemma 6.2. If the entropy sources for a collection of LPN fuzzy
extractors have a joint distribution that can be described by Definition 6.1 for some h, then an algorithm that can extract s from any of the fuzzy extractors in polynomial time with nonnegligible advantage can be used to solve the traditional LPN problem with bias h in polynomial time with non-negligible advantage.
Lemma 6.2 can be proved by recognizing that a set of LPN problems with i.i.d. bits for their e i values can be converted into a collection of LPN problems with bits described by Definition 6.1 by probabilistically applying the identified sequence of linear transformations F to their public keys ðA; bÞ. The proof is given:
Proof. Consider a collection of L different m-bit entropy sources. Let X be the set of all m Â L bits, and let the joint distribution of X be described by Definition 6.1. Specifically, Definition 6.1 takes several parameters. Let the initial bias be h. Let F ¼ fF 0 ; F 1 ; . . . ; F k ; . . .g be the set of affine transformations. Let P ¼ fP 0 ; P 1 ; . . . ; P k ; . . .g be the set of random bits that determines which subset of F i are applied. Let P have some joint distribution. The definition states that we can sample from this distribution in polynomial time. Now, consider the set of L corresponding LPN problems (each using a distinct set of m bits from X as its e i values). Let adversary A take as argument the public parameters of this set of LPN problems: ðA Assume that there exist parameters h, F , and a distribution over P such that A calculates at least one of the secret keys of the set of LPN problems with nonnegligible probability.
Using A, we construct algorithm B that takes as argument the public parameters of L different LPN problems whose e i bits are i.i.d. with bias h. B will return the secret vector of at least one of the LPN problems with nonnegligible probability. Note that B is equivalent to breaking the LPN problem, as each LPN problem is independent.
First, consider a single LPN problem where A ¼ fA 1 ; A 2 ; . . . ; A m g, b ¼ fb 1 ; b 2 ; . . . ; b m g, e ¼ fe 1 ; e 2 ; . . . ; e m g, and b i ¼ A i Á s þ e i . The bits e i have some distribution. The key recognition is that the act of applying an affine transformation to the set of bits e is equivalent to applying the same transformation to A and b. If one wants to transform the distribution by applying F ðeÞ ¼ M Á e þ N (M is an m Â m dimensional matrix and N is an m-dimensional vector), then one can derive a different LPN problem:
Problem 1 :
. . .
Problem 2 :
By modifying only the public parameters, we have transformed the distribution of e i by an affine transformation.
We generalize this to multiple LPN problems by recognizing that the above technique can be applied to the set of equations that comprise multiple LPN problems by simply concatenating the vectors, resulting in Equation (5) . Now, we recognize (where j is concatenation) that to transform a set of problems with e 1 je 2 j . . . e L into a set of problems with F ðe 1 je 2 j Á Á Á e L Þ, one can simply concatenate the aforementioned equations (note that M is now an mLÂ mL sized matrix, and N is a vector of dimension mL):
We now return to the discussion of algorithm B. The algorithm B is the probabilistic application of the above fact multiple times. The steps of B are as follows:
Otherwise, do nothing. 5) Call A using the newly created public parameters for the set of LPN problems. Return the secret vector that A computes. The final value of the public parameters corresponds to a set of LPN problems where the statistics of e j i are equal to those that can be solved by A, and we obtained this problem by modifying bits of the public parameters only. Moreover, since the matrix M in each transformation is full rank, the original secret vectors remain the only solutions to the new LPN problems. Therefore, if A exists, and recovers at least one s with non-negligible advantage, then B can output that s to break the i.i.d. LPN problem with bias h. This is a contradiction if LPN is hard, so A cannot exist. t u
Note that the key step in the above algorithm is that B applies the affine transformation to the public parts of the set of LPN problems. This operation produces a new set of LPN problems that are statistically identical to LPN problems with correlated noise bits, while the secret vectors remain the only solutions.
Also note that a corollary of Lemma 6.2 is that n À oðnÞ bits of s are pseudorandom, even in the presence of correlated bits of e. This is due to the fact that LPN's secret has n À oðnÞ simultaneous hardcore bits [1] and is proven for uncorrelated LWE in [22] . The proof is similar for the correlated LPN construction, as it is independent of the transformations performed in Lemma 6.2.
Security Parameter Derivation
The security goal is that an adversary given helper data must perform Vð2 k Þ operations (k is the security parameter) to discover the secret key. We show below that for our system a key size of n ¼ 128 results in a security parameter of k ¼ 128 against the best known attacks. The equality of key size and security parameter is unusual for security constructions with formal hardness reduction, and is especially unusual for LPN cryptosystems.
There are two key factors enabling this property. First, recognize that typical LPN-based cryptosystems must have a low error rate (e.g., t ¼ Prðe i ¼ 1Þ ¼ 0:0024 [17] ) to ensure correct decryption/verification. We, on the other hand, do not use any LPN encryption/decryption algorithm, and therefore do not have the same restriction on t. In fact, we would like t to be 0.5, representing full entropy in the POK data. However, real POK data is not ideal and may not have full entropy. To be conservative, we pessimistically assume t ¼ h ¼ 0:4 and that the POK bits are correlated in a way that LPN is still hard (formalized in Definition 6.1 and Lemma 6.2).
The second factor is that number of equations in our construction is limited to m 2 Oðn 2 Þ. Current best LPN algorithms are based on the BKW algorithm [10] , which requires m ¼ 2
Oðn=log nÞ . In order to successfully attack the LPN fuzzy extractor, one would have to use the technique from Lyubashevsky [45] , which works with m ¼ Oðn 1þ Þ equations, but immediately increases the runtime to 2
Oðn=log log nÞ .
The idea of Lyubashevsky's algorithm is to generate more equations from the given m ¼ Oðn 1þ Þ equations, increasing the noise rate to
and then using other LPN algorithms, such as BKW [10] , LF1, LF2 [41] as a black box with the increased error rate.
The recent analysis from [12] shows that the LF1, LF2 algorithms empirically have the best performance in the limit of high noise (t L ! 0:5). Table 1 compares BKW, LF1, LF2. Note that each of the above algorithms performs worse than brute-force or does not succeed at all. Therefore, we take n ¼ 128 for a security parameter of k ¼ 128.
STATELESS PUF CONSTRUCTION
Stateless PUF Definition
A Stateless PUF is a pair of functions PUF ¼ fGen POK ; Ver POK g with access to a POK, where Gen POK is responsible for generating and outputting challenge-response pairs, while Ver POK takes a challenge as input, and outputs a response. The intent is for Gen POK to be called multiple times by a verifier over a secure channel to obtain a collection of challenge/response pairs. At a later time, the verifier will send one of these challenges to the PUF over an insecure channel, to which the PUF must generate the correct response. A challenge-response pair therefore can only be used once by Ver POK . k Þ takes as argument the security parameter k. It returns a challenge-response pair fc, rg, with c; r 2 f0; 1g Ã and jcj; jrj 2 polyðkÞ. The subscript POK corresponds to the POK contained within the PUF. That is, each PUF manufactured will have a unique POK according to distribution x over f0; 1g m due to manufacturing variation. The verification algorithm r Ver POK ðcÞ takes as input a challenge c, and returns the corresponding response r. Again, POK refers to the unique POK contained within the PUF. 
Set u ¼ 1=3 to achieve 50 percent success probability [12] . The security parameter is taken for optimal choices of a, b (not shown). The security parameter of LF2 is N/A, because there is no setting of parameters that results in the algorithm converging.
Now we define the security of the Stateless PUF (s À uprd refers to "strong unpredictability" as defined in [4] The s À uprd advantage of A is defined as
While other formalizations of PUF system security have been proposed [4] , ours is slightly different in that in the above case, there is no distinction between helper data and challenge data. Moreover, the PUF is responsible for generating both the challenge and the response for the verifier to use later.
One key recognition in the above definition is that there is no provisioning stage. The algorithms Gen POK and Ver POK may be called in arbitrary order as many times as required. Put differently, there is no stage at which a secret is programmed into the device or an irreversible operation is performed on the device. This is critical, as the overall system can therefore be stateless, and not have to have any additional protections against adversaries attempting to break the provisioning logic of the device.
The formalism of manufacturing unclonability remains the same as that put forth in [4] .
Our Construction
We provide concrete constructions for Gen POK and Ver POK below, which are also illustrated in Fig. 4 .
Construction 7.3 (LPN Stateless PUF).
Let k be a security parameter, with m; n 2 polyðkÞ, and m > n. Let A 2 f0; 1g mÂn be a uniformly random but constant and publicly known matrix row-indexed by i from 1 to m. Let both algorithms have access to the random oracle HðÁÞ. Note that the above construction requires both internal randomness as well as a random oracle.
Remarks
Blocking Malicious Challenges
We have included a binding Hðs; bÞ in the challengeresponse generation, and let Ver POK check if D b ¼ Hðs; bÞ before returning a response. This is important, as Definition 7.2 allows for active adversaries. Without this check, an attacker can trivially win the security experiment by returning an output b by Gen POK with one bit modified; the modified bit is likely not used in the recovery of s at all, and Ver POK will accept, trivially violating strong unpredictability. With this check, if s is recovered correctly, any modification to b will be detected with overwhelming probability.
Hash Function Requirements
HðÁÞ is a random oracle that is well-approximated by the SHA-256 or SHA-3 hash functions, which we denote H 0 ðÁÞ. We require H 0 to be one-way, since we are exposing H 0 ðsÞ. To ensure that an adversary cannot impersonate a PUF, we require non-malleability of H 0 . That is, the adversary should not be able to generate H 0 ðs 1 þ DsÞ given H 0 ðs 1 Þ and Ds. These properties are required because of the use of Hðs; bÞ in the construction.
Controlled PUF
We have described a "vanilla" scheme for authentication where responses are returned in the clear when challenges are applied. However, all the controlled PUF (CPUF) protocols of [25] with small modifications are enabled by our construction. Briefly, the verifier obtains a single challenge-response pair securely, i.e., no eavesdroppers, as before. When the PUF receives a challenge, it does not return the response, but merely generates it internally and bit-exactly. Now, the verifier who knows the response, can use it as a shared secret for repeated nonce-based authentication or secure communication. Other verifiers can use completely different shared secrets.
STATELESS PUF SECURITY ANALYSIS AND ASSUMPTIONS
In the Stateless PUF construction, Gen POK is run multiple times with roughly the same noise term e ¼ e const þ e noise . This deviates from the LPN problem, where the noise term for each equation is required to be independent. Therefore, we will need additional assumptions. We begin by showing a reduction from our construction to LPN, assume that the confidence information (i.e., bias of e noise ) is independent of the actual measurement of the constant component e const . This assumption is equivalent to requiring the POK have independent noise. As discussed in Section 3, this assumption is strong, and not necessarily representative of actual POK behavior. Therefore, we then relax this assumption in Section 8.2 on the POK distribution and show that our construction can be reduced to a new conjecture we call PartialError-Reuse LPN (PER_LPN, cf. Conjecture 8.4), which says informally that LPN is hard even when part of the error bits are reused.
Reduction to LPN Assuming Independence Between Confidence and e const
We start by noting that in order for the construction to reduce to LPN, Gen POK must use the same matrix A on every query to it. Otherwise, an adversary receives two sets of equations with the same e (we do not want to rely on the small noise e noise in POK output for security),
The adversary can add up the equations mod 2, thereby canceling out the e terms, and trivially recovers both s and s 0 . However, we will show in Lemma 8.2 that if the A matrix is the same for the different secrets, discovering any individual secret requires breaking standard LPN. Intuitively, this means access to Gen POK does not help the adversary.
Next we show that access to Ver POK does not help an adversary. By definition, A generates with non-negligible probability a query for which Ver POK would not return ?. Therefore, A can distinguish Ver B;POK from Ver POK . However, regardless of this fact, A must always emit at least one query to Ver B;POK for which Ver POK would not return ?. Given that A makes at most a polynomial number of queries to Ver B;POK , B may choose any of the queries made by A to Ver POK at random and have a non-negligible advantage of returning the "correct" query that would be accepted by Ver POK . Therefore, B has non-negligible Adv sÀuprd PUF ðBÞ.
t u
Now we present the security reduction to LPN.
Lemma 8.2. Let k be a security parameter, n ¼ polyðkÞ, and m ! n. If Conjecture 2.1 is true, there is no PPT A that has advantage Adv sÀuprd PUF ðAÞ non-negligible in k. Proof. Assume that a PPT algorithm A has non-negligible advantage in the experiment in Definition 7.2. According to Lemma 8.1, there exists a PPT algorithm B that has non-negligible advantage in the experiment without making queries to Ver POK . Using B, we will construct an algorithm C that violates the hardness Conjecture 2.1. Algorithm C takes as input a random LPN problem ðb; AÞ, where A 2 f0; 1g mÂn , b 2 f0; 1g m , and b ¼ AÁ s þ e, where s 2 f0; 1g n is uniformly random, and e is chosen according to distribution x. While in standard LPN, x represents an i.i.d. distribution of m bits, the reduction here also applies to the correlated LPN in Lemma 6.2.
When B makes calls HðÁÞ, C faithfully returns the output of HðÁÞ, but records all queries to and responses from HðÁÞ. When B makes calls to Gen POK , C responds using the following simulated version Gen C;POK : _____________________________________________________ The output b 0 by Gen C;POK corresponds to the LPN problem with the random secret ðs þ DsÞ, and is indistinguishable from the output of Gen POK . Note that the 3. After this query, A may have "distinguished" that it is querying Ver B;POK instead of Ver POK , so the behavior of A is undefined.
added e noise models the noisy POK output. 4 Assume e noise does not depend on the constant component of the noise term (e here), so C can sample the confidence information from Nð0; s INTER Þ, and then sample e noise from Nðc; s INTRA Þ on its own according to the distributions in Fig. 3 . Note that this implies that the POK noise is i.i.d.
Furthermore, since HðÁÞ is a random oracle, the output U 1 ; U 2 by Gen C;POK are computationally indistinguishable from D b ; D s by Gen POK . Therefore, C precisely mimics the behavior of Gen POK for B, and with nonnegligible probability, B outputs ffb
s g that is not in table T and makes Ver POK accept
Since HðÁÞ is a random oracle, B must have queried HðÁÞ with s 0 before; otherwise, the probability of D 0 s ¼ Hðs 0 Þ must be negligible. C has recorded all the queries to and responses from HðÁÞ, and thus can retrieve s 0 and compute e 0 . In order for Ver POK to accept B's output, e 0 must be distributed according to the confidence information C sampled. C can then recover e in the same way Recovery does, and then solve for s. If Ver POK accepts B's output with nonnegligible probability, then C recovers e and s with nonnegligible probability. This contradicts Conjecture 2.1. t u
Reduction to PER_LPN
The above security proof requires the confidence information and e noise be independent of e const . Consider a joint distribution for m bits, where a subset of m 0 bits are always 0, and the remaining m À m 0 bits are i.i.d. These m 0 bits correspond to the set of stable bits T from Section 5, and there is perfect correlation between the confidence of a bit and its value. In this case, the above reduction cannot hold, since e noise is not independent of e. In this section, we relax the above requirement to allow dependence between e noise and e const . Let us use the intuition from Section 5 that Gen POK and Ver POK are able to detect a bit's confidence information. Specifically, let us abstract the notion of "stability" and require that a POK be of the form in Definition 8.3. 5 In previous sections of this paper, we set bits in S 0 to '0' and bits in S 1 to '1'. T 0 and T 1 were then "stable '0'"; and "stable '1'" respectively. Instead, consider that for each measurement of POK, bits in S 0 are assigned to '0', and bits in S 1 are assigned to uniformly random values (cf. GEN Noisy in Algorithm 2). The set T 1 now corresponds to bits that are uniformly random with high probability on each measurement. This is illustrated in Fig. 4a using r Consider Gen Noisy POK and Ver Noisy POK , modified according to the discussion above. For technical reasons pertaining the proof of Lemma 8.5, we require that Gen Noisy and Ver Noisy generate/verify a polynomial number of ffA; b; Hðs; A; bÞg; HðsÞg. The reason for this will become apparent in the proof. Further, we modify Ver Noisy POK to check that the stable bits of the POK (the set T 0 ) are not too different from the bits that are stable in the provided samples (computed asT 0 , cf. lines 14-16 of 4. A POK with i.i.d. noise (assumed in this reduction) is modeled by a constant set of bits (e in the algorithm) plus some i.i.d. "noise" (e noise in the algorithm) with some Bernoulli parameter t. Therefore, the summation of e þ e noise accurately models if the Bernoulli parameter of e noise is t.
5.
2 has the same interpretation as in Section 5. However, in Section 5, 2 ¼ 1=n. This is not sufficient for this proof, and we must set 2 ¼ negðkÞ.
Algorithm 2). Namely, Recovery must succeed when using either T 0 orT 0 . With this modification, many of the bits are thrown away, so we can ignore their distribution. We require only that a large enough subset of the bits are replaced with random bits. We conjecture the following modified LPN problem to be hard, and name it "Partial Error Reuse LPN" problem, or PER LPN.
Conjecture 8.4 (PER LPN
, where L is polynomial in n. Let s j 2 f0; 1g n , e j 2 f0; 1g m , A j 2 f0; 1g mÂn , and let fe j g j follow the joint distribution x U below:
1) Randomly select U & ½m of size u; 2) Select e j i with i 6 2 U according to some joint distribution x for each j. 3) Select e j i with i 2 U uniformly from f0; 1g for each j. There does not exist a PPT algorithm for any x that finds all s j in Polyðn; uÞ.
It is important to note that a polynomial number of outputs from Gen Noisy concatenated is a PER LPN problem with overwhelming probability. The bits in T 1 for a certain measurement will remain in S 1 across measurements and are thus made i.i.d. uniform random except with 2 2 negðkÞ probability. This will be the set U in the PER LPN conjecture. The remaining bits can be arbitrarily distributed according to the conjecture.
We now are ready to show that PUF Noisy ¼ fGen Noisy; Ver Noisyg comprises a Stateless PUF according to Definition 7.1. Proof. Given A, we construct B that takes a PER LPN problem as an argument (PerLPNTab) and returns the secret vectors of all members in this set. Whenever A queries Gen Noisy, B answers with a batch of size L in PerLPNTab (so we write PerLPNTab as A's input in Line 2). Since A makes a polynomial number of queries to Gen Noisy, PerLPNTab has polynomial instances.
Recognize that Lemma 8.1 still applies, so we do not need to give A access to Ver Noisy. B also records A's calls to HðÁÞ (and can therefore extract each s from each fHðs; A; bÞ; HðsÞg returned by A).
As mentioned earlier, there exists a PerLPNTab that precisely mimics outputs of Gen Noisy. Therefore, A finally produces Tab that will make Ver Noisy accept with non-negligible probability. Similar to the proof of Lemma 8.2, B can then use the recorded queries to HðÁÞ to recover the error vectors in A's output.
Next, B recovers the secret subsetT 0 & ½m, i.e., the stable bits in PerLPNTab, by looking at the distribution of these errors vectors in A's output and estimating Prðe Find s 0 from recorded queries by A to HðÁÞ.
6:
Compute
ErrSum ¼ ErrSum þ e 0 . 8: end for 9: Set PrErr i ¼ 1=2 À j1=2 À ErrSum i =Lj. 10: SetT 0 to be the set of indices corresponding to the m 0 minimum PrErr i . 11: Run Recovery on each instance in PerLPNTab usingT 0 as the set of stable bits, and return the solutions. 12: end procedure Lemma remarks. The above lemma proves security of the scheme. This proof does not directly rely on the distribution of the bits in e. However, the correctness of the protocol does rely on the distribution. I.e., ifT 0 does not approximate T 0 (and therefore, Recovery fails when called withT 0 ), then Ver Noisy does not accept with high probability.
In the case of an i.i.d. Gaussian distribution of e (as in Section 8.1), one may prove correctness by showing explicitly thatT 0 will with high probability cause Recovery to succeed. We omit this proof here, as it is straightforward.
Further, in the case of the Gaussian distribution (cf. Section 5), we may set 2 ¼ negðkÞ. For example, set 2 ¼ 2 ÀQðlog 2 ðmÞÞ ¼ negðkÞ. From Section 5.4, this implies s r ¼ Qð1= log ðnÞÞ, and therefore the number of correctable errors is Oðm=log ðmÞÞ ¼ e OðmÞ. Further, from Section 5.4, the number of stable bits (i.e., jT 1 j) is m 0 ¼ uðmÞ. This meets Definition 8.3. Now, it may at first seem as though this approach requires the same assumption of i.i.d. POK bits as in Section 8! This is technically true if one desires a mathematical proof of correctness. However, the key difference is that both of the above requirements are empirically verifiable for unknown distributions.
To see the importance of this distinction, we first point out that all POKs that the authors are aware of have unknown distributions, as they are derived from physical systems with complex internal behavior, which is subsequently affected by environmental parameters and noise. There has been significant effort (especially in the silicon POK case [27] , [57] , [42] , [40] , [49] ) to make the POK distribution as close to i.i.d. as possible. However, it is not possible to prove through empirical measurements that a POK distribution is i.i.d.
Any mathematical proof of correctness must assume a property of the POK distribution, and therefore will ultimately have to be empirically verified. For example, information theoretic approaches typically have a min-entropy requirement on the distribution of the POK bits. This requirement is empirically verified through measurement of large samples of POKs [48] .
In the case of the above stateless PUF construction, we require first that jT 1 j ¼ uðmÞ, 2 ¼ negðkÞ. This can be verified by studying the stability of bits. For example, in Section 9, we provide evidence that the Gaussian distribution of bits is correct, and therefore that this is indeed the case. Further, in Section 9, we observe that 76 percent of the ring oscillator bits do not flip across all measurement parameters. Therefore, we do not believe that the above requirement is unreasonable.
Second, we require thatT 0 % T 0 , so that Ver Noisy accepts with high probability. Again, data in Section 9 show that the independent Gaussian model reasonably approximates the behavior of the ring oscillator POK, so Ver Noisy will accept with high probability. However, we note that even if the POK distribution differs slightly from Gaussian, such a difference only affects extraction efficiency, not the security of the construction. Ultimately, in the practical setting, the true extraction efficiency will be measured and optimized empirically for a given POK architecture.
Stateless PUF Theorem
We are now ready to state the security theorem for the stateless PUF constructions. Theorem 8.6. Let k be a security parameter, and n ¼ polyðkÞ.
There exists a choice of n, m ! n, We will use Ring Oscillator POKs as a case study because of the easy availability of confidence information (cf. Fig. 1 ). In the case of the RO POK, the differential counts between the ring oscillators is the confidence information c 0 i , and the output bit e 0 i ¼ Signðc
We have provided a theory explaining the resilience of the LPN construction to noise and environmental parameters using this confidence information in Section 5. Now, we use this theory and collected data from a set of 320 pairs of ring oscillators measured across temperature and voltage ranges to demonstrate the efficiency of the LPN fuzzy extractor construction in a concrete fashion. Experiments were conducted on a Xilinx Virtex 7 Series Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA). We measured the differential counts of a set of 320 ring oscillator pairs in a wide (beyond industrial) range of temperature and voltage. Three interesting points are À40 C@0:95V, 25 C@1:00V, and 105 C@1:05V. Other ranges that we will use are the differential count values at commercial (0 to 70 C) and extended industrial (À40 to 85 C). The s INTRA =s INTER ratios improve as the temperature range is reduced.
We note that 24 percent of the ring oscillator pairs produce different responses in the environmental range; this is the typical OðmÞ error case for such circuits under environmental stresses in the ranges shown.
We first measured the bias of the RO counts across temperature as shown in Table 2 . Therefore, our pessimistic estimate of bias ignoring correlation effects as 45 percent (or 55 percent equivalently) is correct.
These differential count values are distributed according to the distribution discussed in Section 5 with variance s 2 INTER . We verified for each of these temperatures that the distribution of differential counts was Gaussian, as we assumed in Section 5. Each of the fits from which parameters are derived has a reduced x 2 % 1, indicating that the Gaussian model is a good fit to the data within experimental error. Moreover, neither the mean nor variance of the distribution changed significantly over temperature or voltage. Therefore, we describe the distribution in terms of a single mean, variance (m INTER , s INTER ) shown in Fig. 5 .
To measure m INTRA and s INTRA , one must measure the distribution of how these differential counts change regardless of the differential count measured at provisioning. This distribution is Prðc 0 i À c i Þ. We can calculate this distribution by using data from different ring oscillators. We then recognize that the standard deviation of this distribution is s INTRA .
To accomplish this, we used room temperature as a baseline (this would be the condition in which the challengeresponse pairs would be initially generated), and measured how the differential counts change as temperature/voltage vary for each of the 320 ring oscillator pairs. These data provide a statistical distribution of how much the differential count value will change with a change in environmental parameters (the distribution described by s INTRA , m INTRA in Section 5).
The distribution at 105 C is shown in Fig. 5 . The measurements at various temperatures are shown in Table 2 . It is important to note that although in Section 5 we did not present any theoretical justification for the reason why the distribution of counts of a single ring oscillator pair over relevant environmental conditions would be Gaussian, this does turn out to be the case within experimental error as demonstrated in Fig. 5 . Using these measurements, we calculate the ratio
for commercial (0 to 70 C) as 0.20, extended industrial (À40 to 85 C) as 0.29, and the maximum temperature range our experiment could support (À40 to 105 C) as 0.40. This is summarized in Table 3 .
We now present an analysis of the resource requirements (number of RO pairs) of our LPN fuzzy extractor scheme with a security parameter of 128, and probability of error 10 À6 over the above temperature ranges. First, we remark that our theoretical construction in Section 4 is far too conservative for practical purposes. In practice, we simply choose the most stable m 0 ¼ n bits, and most likely there are at most t 0 1 error bits in them. For example, if 2 ¼ 3 Â 10 À6 , a simple binomial distribution analysis shows that Prðt 0 > 1Þ < 10 À6 . Therefore, an exhaustive search over the error bit with a Gaussian elimination operations for each will suffice. values into Equations (3), (4), we compute m (the total number of RO pairs) for various temperature ranges, also shown in Table 3 .
Note that the bits of the extracted bitstring are not all simultaneously pseudorandom with security parameter 128. In order to obtain a pseudorandom bitstring for use as a key, one must use a hash function that approximates a random oracle. To avoid the use of such a function, one may also double the LPN secret size to n ¼ 256 and then select an arbitrary subset of 128 bits. These 128 bits would be pseudorandom by the result from [1] .
Note that our analysis is still pessimistic (e.g., assuming that all stable bits have error probability 2 even though most bits have much lower error probability) and our construction is unoptimized. Even with an unoptimized implementation, these results compare very well with the works described in Section 3. For example, PUFKY [48] requires 2052 helper data bits for a 10À À80 C temperature range, compared to our 450 helper data bits for a comparable 0À À70 C temperature range, and 770 helper data bits for a much wider temperature range À40À À85 C. Moreover, unlike most prior work on information theoretic extractors, our LPN fuzzy extractor can be scaled to higher noise settings simply by increasing m without affecting the security argument.
CONCLUSION
We have presented a computationally secure construction of a stateless Physical Unclonable Function in this paper based on precise hardness assumptions. This has been an open problem for over thirteen years since silicon PUFs were introduced in 2002 [26] .
Our construction is secure in the random oracle model under the difficulty of standard Learning Parity with Noise and a variant LPN problem. Our construction is noise-free; the responses during challenge-response generation and successful verification match exactly. This means that an entity with a single challenge-response pair can authenticate the PUF any number of times by treating the response as a shared secret. All the protocols described in [25] are enabled by our construction.
In order to construct a noise-free PUF, we presented the first construction of a computational fuzzy extractor with a trapdoor in this paper, using the standard LPN problem as the hard problem. The trapdoor allows our construction to correct QðmÞ errors in polynomial time. We relaxed the i.i.d. assumptions on the POK outputs showing that if correlation can be estimated, the only change to the fuzzy extractor construction is in the selection of parameters.
We show how error profiles obtained from a Field Programmable Gate Array implementation of PUFs subject to wide environmental variation can be efficiently corrected The percentage of erroneous bits over environmental conditions and associated ratio is displayed. Extraction succeeds with error probability < 10 À6 and a security parameter of 128.
using helper data sizes that are substantially smaller than prior art.
Lastly, we remark that certain human biometrics may also produce confidence information. Ongoing work includes testing our constructions on biometrics.
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